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I. This Court Should Correct the Error of the Court of 
Appeals in Overlooking Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
302(7) (b) (2000) Finding Reckless Disregard by 
Stevenson. 
The Utah Legislature obviously utilized the framework of 
federal case law in drafting Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(2000) in 
addressing and framing its definition of "willfulness."' To 
characterize the Appellant's position as "discrediting federal 
law" is inaccurate. But the Utah statute should be correctly 
applied and interpreted. 
This Court is capable of weighing the literal language of 
the State's statute and determining the legislative intent 
therein. Additionally, though the Appellee's Brief alleges 
there is uniformity in the federal court cases, modifications on 
the definition of "willfulness" and its varied application to 
particular cases illustrates that uniformity is an illusory term. 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-15.) 
The knowledge Stevenson had of noncompliance in Tower's 
filing returns, in signing checks to pay withholding tax, and in 
awareness of the history of Kenneth Steckelberg's prior 
mismanagement, meet the threshold of statutory reckless disregard 
of obvious (or known) risks contained in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
302(7) (b) (2000) . 
The crux of Appellant's argument regarding use of the Utah 
statute, is that the first level of review by this Court is the 
language of the statute. The Utah language does not mirror the 
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federal statute. That may be significant. The Court of Appeals 
did not think it was. The Commission focused on the state 
statute, but does not have the authority to create legal 
precedent. This Court does, and should direct the future 
interpretation and application in administrative actions and 
cases. Appellant thinks the record establishes the criteria for 
a prima facie case and encourages this Court to agree. 
II. The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Applied the Principle 
of Preferring Other Creditors over the State 
Government, Due to Stevenson's Control of Funds. 
Even if this Court adopts the application of federal cases 
in defining willfulness under the Utah statute, the facts here 
still favor Stevenson's liability. A crucial issue in Finley v. 
United States, 123 F.3d 1342, (10th Cir. 1997) and other cases 
cited by Appellee, is the extent of control demonstrated or 
exercised over funds by the responsible person. 
A close examination of the principles reflected in In re: 
Premo, 116 B.R. 515, 535 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mich., 1990) shows how the 
facts of that case differ from Stevenson. The facts in Premo 
note that "the Debtor testified that the funds used to pay 
employees came directly from [Michigan National Bank] MNB, and 
were forwarded to Tri-Cities for the specific purpose of paying 
payroll." (id. at 536.) The court continued to clarify when 
funds can be considered encumbered for purposes of excusing an 
otherwise responsible person from the obligation of willfully 
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failing to withhold and remit to the government. The court 
stated "In determining whether funds are encumbered, the cases 
have focused on the extent to which the employer has unimpaired 
access to or control of the funds." (id. at 536.) In that case, 
the Debtor, Michael J. Premo, had no prior training or experience 
in finance, and for a newly formed corporation, Tri-Cities 
Computer Mart, Inc., it hired an individual as CFO. The CFO was 
the person with the responsibility and control of the financial 
operation of the corporation. After four years passed, the 
Debtor only became aware of financial troubles through direct 
notice by MNB. In further defining the concept of "encumbrance," 
the Court continued, "As previously stated, the fact that funds 
are subject to a security interest does not itself warrant a 
finding that the funds are 'encumbered.' The IRS is therefore 
correct in stating '[t]he mere existence of a security interest 
in favor of one creditor cannot be held to given a responsible 
person the blanket license to prefer all types of other creditors 
over the United States.'" (Xd. at 536.) Then that court excuses 
the Debtor since MNB only permitted the funds it supplied to be 
used for current payroll purposes and payment of minimal 
operating expenses such as rent and utilities. MNB did not 
permit any of the funds to be applied toward delinquent 
withholding taxes. The creditor in Premo had much greater 
control over the use of funds than the Bank of Utah did in this 
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case. 
Stevenson had prior involvement as the sole check signer for 
Tower. Stevenson had also signed returns for the second and 
fourth quarter of 1999. In November of 2000, Stevenson became 
fully aware of the financial condition, but certainly 
historically had greater involvement than the Debtor did in 
Premo. (See Statement of Facts in Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-7.) 
The actions of Stevenson demonstrated that he, not the Bank 
of Utah, was in control as to what creditors were paid. On 
November 15, 2001, Stevenson completed the orchestration of 
obtaining payment from XO Communications. (See Appellant's 
Brief, Addendum D.) After Stevenson paid personal funds to 
acquire the assignment from subcontractors (funds which were 
totally unencumbered), Stevenson acted as a signer for Tower and 
personally, in concert with Brett Cherry, in the contract to 
obtain the specific account receivable for XO Communications and 
then directed that the check from XO Communications be directly 
paid to the Bank of Utah. (See Appellant's Brief, Statement of 
Facts, pp. 7-8.) 
A. Stevenson's Self-interest in Actions Taken after 
November 2000, Demonstrate Use of Personal Assets 
for Corporate Purpose. 
Since Stevenson had competing responsibilities as an officer 
of the Bank of Utah, and an officer of Tower, the specter of 
self-serving interest in seeing to it that the Bank of Utah was 
4 
paid before or instead of other creditors, taints the 
characterization of his actions as a simple response to a secured 
creditor. 
The trust fund nature of withholding tax was raised in the 
formal hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. at 232, 
234.) Further, until the decision of the Court of Appeals, the 
issue of encumbered priority among secured creditors was not in 
issue. Since it is arguable that the secured interest of the Tax 
Commission is at least on equivalent footing with the interest of 
the Bank of Utah, it further differentiates the Stevenson case 
from Premo, and like cases raised in Appellee's Brief. 
Appellee argues that the Administrative Law Judge needed to 
make a specific finding in the Commission's order, that it must 
constitute a preference for those creditors over the Tax 
Commission. (Appellee's Brief at 18-19.) If that was an 
oversight, this Court can correct that oversight by making a 
determination on the record that the payment did constitute 
commitment of personal funds for corporate purposes, "priming the 
pump" to allow the collection of an outstanding account 
receivable from XO Communications. Without that priming, no 
collection of funds would have occurred, and Stevenson risked 
both the attempt to collect for Tower, and risked his standing 
with the Bank of Utah. 
Appellee discounts the use of the lien statute, Utah Code 
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Ann. § 59-10-406(6) due to an unfiled warrant and a reference to 
Phillips Petroleum v. Waastaff. 450 P.2d 100 (Utah 1969). The 
Phillips court was distinguishing cases on the notice to the 
secured creditor of the tax amount due and delinquent. A warrant 
filed would give that notice. Here, a warrant could not be filed 
because Stevenson's filing a Petition for Redetermination stayed 
further collection action by the Commission, including filing 
warrant. No warrant will be filed until final disposition, and 
only if that favors the Commission. But Tower and Stevenson had 
actual notice of the assessment and the amount, and the statute 
creates in them constructive of lien also. 
III. The Supreme Court Should Weigh Both the Facts and the 
Law in the Record to Determine if the Court of Appeals 
Applied the Standard of Review Correctly. 
This Court has weighed issues of fact and law multiple times 
in prior decisions. The Appellant does not presume that mixed 
questions off fact and law are easy to determine. However, the 
specific statutory requirement of a prima facie case is 
established by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) (b) . The facts 
presented at the formal hearing are summarized in the record and 
the decision of the Tax Commission. The standard of review, as 
articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(2000), is also clear. 
The Appellant has confidence that this Court will determine those 
matters of fact and issues of law and allow the deference to the 
Commission to which it is entitled. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the need to establish local precedent with 
regard to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302, and the particular facts and 
legal issues raised in relation to Stevenson, his position with 
both Tower and the Bank of Utah, Appellant requests that the 
Court affirms the decision of the Tax Commission and overrules 
and clarifies the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
DATED this /J) "day of December, 2005. 
GALE KVFRANCIS^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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